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OIL AND GAS LAW REFORM IN RUSSIA:
THROUGH THE SMOKE OF BATTLE
Sheila S. Hollis and John W. Berresford*
I. INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas are not "just another commodity" in Russia. They are of
overriding importance to the nation, as they are to the worldwide economy.
The magnitude of Russia's reserves is believed to be greater than that of
Saudi Arabia and many other potent oil-producing nations. To the Russian
economy, those reserves are the fastest route to earn desperately needed
hard currency in the short term; in the long term, oil and gas are the
resources that will lift Russia to full membership in the world economic
system. To foreigners (non-Russians) in the business, Russia is one of the
last great frontiers, and maybe the last frontier.
The development of Russian oil and gas has been swept up into huge
political conflicts about the country's future. The old ways are discredited,
but the new ones have not been charted (much less travelled). Physical
structures are deteriorating rapidly' so something must be done, but no one
agrees what or how. Free market ideas seem unreal in a system that has
known only control for seventy years and more recently only chaos. The
old guard opposes radical change and, one suspects, is holding out for a
* Copyright 1993 and all rights reserved. Article presented at the International Energy Law
Symposium at The University of "Tlsa College of Law, Spring 1993.
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1. After years of surplus and hard currency earnings, Russia's production declined sharply in
1992 and 1993, chiefly through neglect of infrastructure. It is even feared that in 1994 Russia may have
no surplus at all to export and will need to spend hard currency on imports just to meet the internal
needs of its restive populace. Bunr, Lenin, Burn, Tim ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1993 at 52; Russia's Cold
Shoulder, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1993 at 73. See generally D. REMNIcK, LENIn's TOMB at 24, 199
(Random House 1993).
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central role in any new arrangements.2 Foreigners want to follow their own
accustomed ways, with minimal risk and with a return as prompt and abun:
dant as possible.
For almost three years, this strife has echoed through attempts to
reform Russia's oil and gas laws. So many drafts have circulated reflecting
the opinions of so many groups (and compromises among them) that it
would be pointless to compare one with another (and another, and so on).
Rather, this article will concentrate on the basic issues and basic "conserva-
tive" and "reformist" positions.
II. THE CONSERVATIVE POSITION
The views of the "old guard" on oil and gas reform are based on and
reflected in the fundamental Russian law on the subject, The Law of the
Russian Federation on Underground Natural Resources ("Underground
Resources Law").3 This law (and others) keep oil and gas, to the greatest
extent possible, in the hands of the government and out of those of private
(especially foreign) owners.4 Many, many layers of government must be
pierced before limited "rights to use" may be the objects of "commercial
relations." 5
Rights to use (that is, to operate an extraction business), when finally
granted, may include rights to sell and export, but these are subject to the
discretion of the licensing authorities.6 The general effect is to discourage
the foreign developer and to leave unfettered negative power in the hands
of the government.
2. The old guard in oil and gas has more credibility than elsewhere because, for so many years,
their system worked rather well. Oil and gas were found, extracted, and refined. The country was
heated. Vast amounts of hard currency were earned by sales of surplus to foreigners. Soviet oil and gas
experts contributed to development of petroleum resources in other Soviet bloc countries and
developing countries. All these efforts were accomplished while supplying a massive military complex
with its energy needs. Few industries of the Soviet era have such a solid record. The old system began
to disintegrate only in 1986 with the worldwide decline in oil and gas prices. See Khartukov &
Fesharaki, Ex-Soviet Oil Industry: Humpty Dumpty All Over Again?, 10 Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n. Rev. at
41 (1992).
3. [title in Russian transliterated in English letters], Law of the Russian Federation On
Underground Natural Resources, citation to Vedomosti RSFSR, Feb. 21, 1992. [hereinafter
Underground Resource Law] (all Vedomosti RSFSR citations on file with the Library of Congress).
4. See [transliteration of Russian title], id., Article II, (providing that all used and unused areas
of underground resources located within the Russian Federation constitute the state fund of
underground resources). See also KONsT. RSFSR, Art. XI, 1992, Constitution of the Russian
Federation, Art. XI; KoaNsr. SSSR, Art. VI, Dec. 12, 1992, (providing for property laws); Id. at § 1
(prohibiting private ownership of underground resources); [transliteration of Russian title], Basic Civil
Legislation, Art. IV, Vedomosti RSFSR 91-22-768, 1992 (holding that underground resources are not
real estate); [transliteration of Russian title], Law Regarding Provision of the Economic Basis of the
Sovereignty of the Russian Federation, Art. I, Vedomosti: 120690, 1992.
5. These layers include the Russian Federation itself, its sixteen autonomous Republics, its five
autonomous provinces ("oblasts"), ten autonomous regions (variously called "okrugs," "krais," and
"raions"), municipalities and within each of these, various legislatures, ministries, departments,
bureaus, and courts.
6. See [transliteration of Russian title], Underground Resources Law, supra note 3, art XXII.
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The Russian government, in one of its first acts, took most of the for-
mer Soviet oil and gas apparatus and formed it into a wholly owned subsid-
iary called the Russian State Oil and Gas Corporation ("Rosneftegaz"). 7
While nominally a move towards privatization, this entity is suspected to be
the old Soviet bureaucracy in entrepreneurial clothing. These new "cap-
tains of industry" are expected to keep whatever they can of their former
franchise on all parts of the business in Russia.
Conspicuous by their absence from the conservative posture are: mar-
ket mechanisms, any check on government power, room for private incen-
tive, and any impetus to efficiency, cost containment, cost-based pricing, or
quality control. One senses that the conservatives would like to leave these
and other matters as discretionary as possible. This serves the aims of pre-
serving their (Rosneftegaz's) dominant position, delaying change, and con-
tinuing Russia's centuries-old tradition of bureaucratic fiat (subject to
unilateral change at any time) as the principal way of doing business.8
ILL. Ti REFORMIST PosrToN
Many Russians and almost all foreigners consider that vastly more
change is needed for Russia's oil and gas complex. They call for the crea-
tion of something approximating the western model of free enterprise
under government regulation, as in New Deal-era regulatory agencies and
state public utility commissions. Of course, this is easier said than done.
Even at a conceptual level, it is difficult to say exactly where to begin, how
fast to go, and how far.9 And "models" are worthless, even harmful, in
reality if they are too far ahead of the people, and no one follows them.
The reformists are concentrating on drafting a Russian Federation
Law on Oil and Gas ("Oil and Gas Law"), which is to be a statute comple-
menting the Underground Resources Law. 0 Russian drafting has been led
by the Federation's Ministry of Fuels and Energy. The Ministry was
assisted by the University of Houston Law Center and the World Bank,
both of which are interested in creating a welcoming environment for for-
eign investment.
The law, when it is adopted, will be some amalgam of the drafts now in
circulation. Certain key points of it are reasonably clear.
First, the law will establish a logical sequence of licensing for different
kinds of activities (exploration, production, and export). In the most
recent drafts, a license to explore a territory is not exclusive and creates no
preference for the explorer when it comes time to issue a license to pro-
7. Khartukov & Fesharaki, supra note 2, at 44.
8. See generally [transliteration of the Russian title], Underground Resources Law, supra note 3.
Bureaucratic fiat as a way of life in Russia pre-dates communism. See NIxOLAi GoGoL, DEAD SOULS
159-73 (Penguin Books 1993) (1842).
9. For example, the creation of Rosneftegaz out of the old Soviet bureaucracy may be a form of
privatization (and therefore a good thing); but without any antitrust principles or enforcement, the new
company may become simply a profit-maximizing, unregulated and unaccountable monopoly.
10. Underground Resources Law, supra note 3.
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duce in the territory. Licenses to produce may be exclusive but need not
be.
Multiple layers of government remain involved in the licensing pro-
cess; there is no one body determining the chronological, geographical, and
functional scope of licenses and choosing licensees from among applicants.
Federal-state conflicts, however, are reduced to some extent by broad
grants to the Russian Federation Government of authority to approve all
regulations issued by lower levels and all licenses granted to non-Russians.
Licenses will be granted based on competitive bids or auctions, with negoti-
ation remaining an option in limited instances.'1
Licenses, while not approaching the status of an American title in fee
simple, convey something approximating vested rights and may not be
altered or revoked by the government except in rare circumstances and for
good cause. Licenses are generally transferrable, even to non-affiliates.
Holders of production licenses may have their terms extended beyond their
nominal expiration. Competition will be injected into the operation of
pipelines, with equal access to them guaranteed for all similarly situated
users. There is also talk of a statutory pro rata allocation scheme in the
event of a shortfall in pipeline capacity.
Finally, the reform proposals make a laudable start towards a system
of taxation (or, more broadly, raising revenue for the government) that is
comprehensible and stimulates exploration, development, production, and
efficiency. Today, companies interested in Russian oil and gas face an
array of payments to government authorities that are uncertain in their
application and bewildering in their number. Payments are required by
acts of the Russian Federation Parliament, 12 by Presidential Decrees, by
Executive Orders, by regulations issued by various ministries of the Feder-
ation government, and by similar enactments of republics, autonomous
regions, and cities.13 There are fees, royalties, taxes, remittances, duties,
commissions, tariffs, and contributions; and in some cases there are exemp-
tions from the foregoing. Payments, to name just a few, are required in
exchange for licenses granted by different government units covering
exploration, exploitation, and extraction.' 4 Payments are also required for
the right to use the surface and subsoil (and offshore waters and sea bed),
for the production of raw materials (and even for the production of geos-
cientific information' 5 ), for the import of equipment and other tangibles, 6
11. Negotiation is the least preferred means of granting licenses because compared to competitive
bids and auctions it is the most susceptible to several forms of abuse.
12. Examples include [transliteration of Russian title], the Underground Resources Law, supra
note 3.
13. There is, predictably, a gargantuan battle among these government entities in Russia for the
revenues collected under these exactions. The Underground Resources Law purports to divide the
collection of certain royalties among certain government units, but this division reflects, at most, the
outcome of a battle; the war goes on.
14. See, e.g., [transliteration of Russian title], Underground Resources Law, supra note 3.
15. See, e.g., [transliteration of Russian title], Underground Resources Law, supra note 3 and
regulations thereunder.
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and for exporting different kinds of petroleum products.17 This list does
not reach the additional payments that are called for in laws and regula-
tions that apply generally to foreign businesses. 18
This Gordian Knot of financial incentives and penalties cannot, of
course, be cut clean through by the Oil and Gas Law.19 But the drafters of
the Law do appear to be thinking of revenue raising, however it is labeled,
as a comprehensive process rather than a series of "gotcha's." They also
are planning it as a process that should, on the whole, stimulate optimal
behavior by foreign enterprises - long-term investment, production of
added value, and development of Russia's resources consistent with Rus-
sian national and local interests. Some drafts of the Oil and Gas Law con-
template fees and taxes being set not at "whatever the market will bear,"
but on a rational basis - for example, reflecting the government's cost of
processing an application or the value of the right being granted, or in
order to stimulate desired behavior (high-volume production, environmen-
tal protection, etc.).
Another encouraging development is that most drafts of the Law
adopt the principle that the developer is entitled to earn a reasonable rate
of return on his investment. While arguments over what is "reasonable"
are inevitable, this is a significant reduction of downside risk and a remark-
able principle to find stated in the laws of a country which recently consid-
ered such ideas to be anathema.
Finally, by reading between the lines of the various drafts, one can
detect a few ideas taking shape slowly that are recognizable to a westerner.
The oil and gas law will make clearer the separation between government
(the owner of oil and gas and regulator of their use) and business (its devel-
oper and user). It will place more property rights in private hands, includ-
ing foreign ones. It also presumes equality of treatment for Russian and
foreign investors and for all similarly-situated licensees in bidding, taxation,
and access to pipelines. Marketplace mechanisms, entrepreneurship, and
16. See, e.g., [transliteration of Russian title], (Presidential Decree 630), Vedomosti RSFSR 1992
(concerning imports).
17. See, e.g., [transliteration of Russian title], (Presidential Decree 628) Vedomosti RSFSR 1992
(concerning exports), and [transliteration of Russian title], (Presidential Decree 629), Vedomosti
RSFSR 1992 (concerning export duties), and [transliteration of Russian title], (Executive Order 1375),
Vedomosti RSFSR July 27, 1992 (exempting certain foreign owned enterprises from certain export
duties).
18. Id. These also include [transliteration of Russian title], (Presidential Decree 629) Vedomosti
RSFSR, (concerning export duties), supra note 17; [transliteration of Russian title], (Presidential
Decree 630), Vedomosti 1992 (concerning imports; currency repatriation tax; corporate income tax and
"super profits" taxes); [transliteration in Russian title], the Law on Mortgages, Vedomosti 1992,
(concerning the recordation of real estate transactions and mortgages); and other laws which, while not
expressly finance-related, directly impact the ability to earn and keep revenue, such as [transliteration
of Russian title], (Presidential Decree 854), Vedomosti RSFSR 1992 (concerning import and export
licenses and quotas for commodities, works and services).
19. To be fair, it must be admitted that all the revenue-raising measures of the United States'
federal, state, and local governments and agencies do not form a symphony of Mozartian clarity and
symmetry. Perhaps the western reaction to the Russian system comes fron its newness and the lack of
operating experience among its administrators.
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competition will multiply, and foreign investment in and profit from oil and
gas in Russia will generally rise from a seigniorial favor to a regular
practice.
IV. OUTLOOK
The conflict between the old guard and the reformists was evinced in
several skirmishes as the draft laws proliferated. The two groups disputed,
for example, whether the general Underground Resources Law or the spe-
cific Oil and Gas Law would prevail where the two are in conflict. The
conservatives, of course, wanted the Underground Resources Law to reign
supreme, conceivably nullifying virtually the entire Oil and Gas Law. The
reformists, on the other hand, wanted the Oil and Gas Law to govern and
to spell out in one place a comprehensive regulatory plan. This may be
resolved in a section of the Oil and Gas Law, or may be left, after it is
enacted, to resolution as individual problems come up.
Another flashpoint of old guard and reformist conflict was whether
and to what degree the government's oil and gas assets would be privatized
under Russia's sweeping laws on that subject.2'
At the center of the conflict, though, was the drafting process of the
Oil and Gas Law. The Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Ministry of
Ecology and Natural Resources were supposed to prepare a draft by mid-
1992. The reformists' draft was prepared with the University of Houston
and the World Bank, and was circulated a few months later. The old guard
countered with their own draft, prepared by a scientific institute. Consider-
ation by the Parliament was scheduled for December 1992, but "compro-
mise" drafts proliferated and other events pushed oil and gas reform into
the background. In December, the issue was effectively tabled in the
Supreme Soviet.
Larger issues then occupied the Russian government and petroleum
industry - chiefly, the substitution of Viktor Chernomyrdin for Mr.
Gaidar as Prime Minister and the huge power struggle between Yeltsin and
the old guard.2
With Yeltsin's victory at the polls in April 1993 and his fiery victory
over the Parliamentary reactionaries in October, the chances of a reformist
Oil and Gas Law increased dramatically. However, it is unlikely that any
law will be enacted before mid-1994. Elections for a new legislature are
scheduled for late 1993, with the elected representatives to convene early
the following year. A new legislature in its first session will require months
to fashion such a significant piece of legislation.
20. Yeltsin Orders Privatization Move for Russian Oil, 90 OIL & GAS J. 37 (1992) (describing "stiff
opposition by Communists and u]tranationalists").
21. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin can be expected to give special attention to oil and gas matters.
He has had a long career in the industry, most recently as Vice Prime Minister, Ministry of Fuels and
Energy. Those favoring a resolution - any resolution - in this area should rejoice at the presence of
someone at the top of the Russian government with so much experience. Even without his personal
background, anyone in his position would recognize that boosting production (or, at least, slowing its
decline) is an urgent national need.
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Members of the worldwide oil and gas business, of course, have their
own keen interests in developing Russia's reserves - to ensure their own
long-term future and to help Russia become a prosperous (and petroleum-
based) country. While the creation of an effective Law has been on hold,
deals are taking place between many companies and Russia, as well as
many of the CIS states.22 Thus, transformations in the industry's opera-
tions may precede the clarification and finalization of a reshaped legal
framework. Nothing this big and complicated can be done simply or
quickly.' Risks, difficulties, crises, and success have characterized the oil
and gas business in other countries. Visionaries in the business will remain
obsessed with this latest "Prize"' 4 and will want to be heard in the halls and
lobbies of the new Russian Federation Legislature as the new oil and gas
law approaches enactment.
22. Agis Salpukas, In an Oil Rush to the East; Elf Plays Pied Piper, NEW YORK TIES, June 27,
1993, at F7. Indeed, other CIS countries have gone much farther than Russia in welcoming foreign
petroleum companies. See, e.g., Kazakhstan's Oil Industry - Tomorrow's Gusher, THE ECONOMIST, July
25, 1992, at 72.
23. Westerners who wish that Russia would "just let us do what we'd like" should remember the
Shah of Iran, who accommodated foreigners while ignoring the real needs of his own, increasingly
restive, people.
24. Dr. Daniel Yergin, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, has concluded that Russia could well be
the most attractive new opportunity in the oil world. DANIEL YERGiN, TmE PRiuZ: THE QUEST FOR
OIL, MONEY & POWER 773-80 (1991).
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